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Pure Price Effects of
Nonwage Compensation
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the pure static price effects which areengendered
by tax preferences fornonwage compensation. Section II demonstrates
that,because of these price effects, optimal consumption bundles will
contain larger quantities of the goods included in nonwage compensation,
and smaller quantities of other goods, than they would in the absence of
tax preferences. In the presence of preferences, the cost of a compensa-
tion package to an employer usually differs from its value to an
employee.
Under proportional taxation, compensationpackages which contain
optimal quantities of nionwage compensation may be between 4 and 13>
less expensive than cash compensation sufficient topurchase, at retail,
consumption bundles providing similar util ity.Thisdifference repre-
sents a substantial savings to employers. It is largely attributableto
reductions in tax payments, and may represent substantialforegone tax
revenues. Optimal provision of nonwage compensation confersgreater
advantages under progressive taxation, advantages which increase with
the degree of progressivity.
These considerations are important in the analysis of any issue to
which employee 'income' or employer costs are relevant. As examples,
Section III demonstrates that conventional definitions of income un-
avoidably generate incorrect conclusions with regard to evaluations of




Flushing, NY }J367NonwaQe compensation, in all its forms, has become a substantial corn—
ponent of employee income, employer labor costs and national income in
the years since World War II. In consequence, compensation forlabor
services is now more complex than is the price of any other commodity.
This paper addresses these complications in a simple, static context.
Within that context, it explores the most important incentive to nonwage
compensation: price effects which arise out of income tax exemptions on
consumption goods received as compensation in kind. It demonstrates
these effects through the contrasts between optimal consumption packages
under personal provision, and optimal compensation packages under
employer provision of the goods which comprise 'fringe benefits'.
Income tax exemptions insure that optimal employer provision of
benefit goods is always less expensive than optimal personal provision.
In simulations with proportional tax schemes and reasonable utility
parameters, the costs of optimal consumption packages exceed the costs
of optimal compensation packages of the same util it>' value by 4< to 13.
These advantages derive largely from impi icit tax subsidies to employers
offering nonwage compensation, which may represent large sacrifices in
income tax revenue. They may be compounded by changes in consumption
composition which further reduce employer expenditures on employee
compensation.
The differences between employer and personal provision, or between
levels of employer provision, distort all interpersonal comparisons
which require accurate measures of individual welfare. For example,distributions of employer compensation costs and earnings under employer
provision overstate the attenuation r distributions of employee
util it>'. Distributions of disposable earnings ——netof income tax
payments ——understateutility distributions. Taxation of earrings
results in actual tax progressivity which exceeds nominal proQressivity.
Differences in compensation costs and earnings overstate returns to
human capital, while differences in disposable earnings understate them.
1. Nonwage Compensation in the nerican Economy
When a benefit program is paid for by the company, I do not
think most employees think of it as a trade—off with their
paycheck. And, while I recognize that, ultimately, there is no
free lunch ——andthere is a total limit on compensation
dollars —Iam not really sure that we are looking at it in
that contexteither. (Harold P. Kneen, Jr., Director of
Employment Benefits, International Business Machines Inc.,
quoted in Conference Board)
Total employer costs for fringe benefits cannot be equated
with total income of the employee because anumber of
benefits, such as pensions, provide the worker with no im—
mediate additional income. Other benefits, such as supplemen-
tal unemployment benefits, provide economic security against a
circumstance which may never materialize. (Oswald and Smyth)
Modern compensation packages contain many nonwage components in addition
to wage or salary payments. The economic implications of these 'fringe
benefits' are subject to much greater misunderstanding than are the
traditional cash components.
In principle, the marginal dollar of expenditure on nonwage compensa—
tion ought to elicit the same labor effort as does the marginal dollarof expenditure on cash compensation (Triplett). 14 this relationship is
not enforced, compensation dollars will be expended inefficiently. Kneen
suggests that employers fail to recoanize the costs associated i.jith
haphazard compensation practices.
Nonwage compensation is comprised of goods ——insuranceand savings
programs among them ——whichwould be bought with disposable income if
they were not included as part of the compensation package. Cash income
is preserved when they are provided by the employer. Oswald and Srnyth
demonstrate that employees fail to recognize the contribution of nonwage
compensation to real income.
This confusion is not limited to those who provide and those who
receive. The United States Congress and the Internal Revenue Service ——
thosewho tax ——continuallyredraw distinctions between those com-
ponents of compensation which constitute 'Income" for tax purposes, and
those which do not (AICPA). Economists ——thosewho measure ——have
neglected the nonwage components of total compensation in their analyses
of labor and consumption markets.
2
Nonwage components of compensation are now sufficiently important
1
Oswald and Srnyth appear to assert that employer expenditures are
greater than the value an employee receives. Section II of this
paper demonstrates that a well—chosen compensation package is worth
more to its recipients than the employer expenditure it represents.
2
Duncan and 4oodbury are recent exceptions. Atrostic includes both
wages and nonpecuniary benefits among the costs of leisure.
—3—that such confusion is costly.The value of nonwage compensation in
the American economy of 1982 is estimated at $510 bill ion. This total
represents approximately 21'. of national income. Nonwage compensation
comprised 29.1'. of expenditures for' employee compensation among firms
surveyed by the Chamber of Commerce in that year.
Despite the magnitude of nonwage compensation payments in a modern
economy, employers, employees and economists are understandably uncer—
tam about the roles they play. Their role varies substantially between
individual firms. Among firms surveyed by the Chamber of Commerce in
1982, four percent reported expenditures for nonwage compensation equiv-
alent to less than 18Y of payroll. Nearly four percent reported expendi-
tures equal to 60Y. or more of payroll. Almost all firms offer life
insurance coverage. Eighty—six percent of firms offer paid vacations.
Just half of firms, 53, offer dental insurance. Only 26.< offer con-
tributions to employee thrift plans.
The variety of modern compensation packages is matched by the multi-
plicity of goals they attempt to achieve. They may include provisions
for human capital investments, work incentives, career development,
risk—sharing, insurance, saving and current consumption, as well as the
exchange of cash for output. These packages are constructed to satisfy
an array of requirements established by competitive pressures, social
obl igatioris and legal responsibilities. They create a complicated,
sometimes contradictory array of incentives which cannot be analyzed in
The statistics quoted inthisparagraph and the next are derived
from the Chamber of Commerce, 1984.
—4—its entirety within the confines of this paper.
The discusson below explores the simple economic responses elicited
by the most important characteristic of nonwage compensation components.
Most forms of nonwage compensation are not taxed as income. The employer
can provide benefit goods to his employees with pre—tax dollars. The
employee would have to expend post—tax dollars if he purchased them
himself. Employers can therefore 'buy' benefit goods for their employees
at a 'price' which is lower than that charged of individual employees in
retail exchanges. The employer 'price' of benefit goods may be further
reduced through bulk discounts offered by vendors who value the transac-
tional economies employers can provide. This price advantage is the
principle reason for which goods are offered, and accepted, as compensa—
t i on.
This paper discusses the pure static price effects which are engen—
5. dered by tax preferences for nonwage compensation. Section II
demonstrates that these price effects have three major implications: In
general, the cost of a compensation package to an employer is not the
same as its value to an employee. Individuals with identical utility
functions and identical levels of utility will choose different consump-
tion bundles if one receives some compensation in kind while the other
receives compensation in only cash. Individuals whose marginal rates of
This analysis abstracts fromallquestions of risk—sharing or
dynamic optimization.
5. . Differencesacross employers in bulk purchase discounts create price
effects which duplicate those of tax preferences. Inter—employer
differences in these discounts are discussed more fully in Zax.
—5—substitution are identical whenever their consumption bundles have
identical composition, but who receive different 'incomes', will choose
consumption bundles of differing composition if the rate of income
taxation depends upon the level of taxable income.
These implications are important in the analysis of any issue to
which employee 'income' or employer costs are relevant. Conventional
definitions of income unavoidably generate incorrect conclusions in many
important interpersonal comparisons. Section III demonstrates that
evaluations of income distribution, proqressivity of taxation, and
returns to human capital depend critically upon the measure of income on
which they are based.
LI. Optimal Compensation Packages
Individuals obtain benefit goods in two distinct 'markets'. Under
employer provision, they receive nonwage compensation from their
employers in partial exchange for labor. Under personal provision, they
purchase benefit goods from retail vendors out of disposable income.
6
6
Employer and personal provision are mutually exclusive alternatives
in the analysis presented here. In addition, employees are not
permitted to resell benefit goods received as part of compensation.
In practice, many individuals supplement benefit goods provided b>'
their employers with further retail purchases. This behavior is
discussed further in Zax.
—6—The analysis in this section derives optimal compensation packaQes in
the case of employer provision, and optimal consumption bundles in the
case of personal provision, with both proportional and progressive
taxation. It demonstrates that employer provision can always attain a
given level of util it>' at less total expense under proportional taxation
than can personal provision. The advantage to employer provision is
increased under progressive taxation. However, employers can only real-
ize these advantages if they know the utility functions of their
employees. Compensation packages which are ineptly composed can cost the
employer more than would cash compensation of identical value to the
employee.
A. Fundamental Concepts
Several concepts of income and consumption are essential to the
relationships between benefits provision, consumption value and compen-
sation cost. The definitions themselves demonstrate several important
characteristics of optimal compensation packages.
Non—benefit goods are represented by the index good x. This good is
also the numeraire good; its retail price is unity. However, it is taxed
at the rate of t. In compensation packages, x represents post—tax wage
compensation, or disposable earnings. Pre—tax wage compensation, or
earnings, are x(1+t). In consumption bundles, x represents post—tax
nonbenefit consumption, and x(1+t) represents pre—tax nonbenefit con—
—7—surnp tI on.
Benefit goods are represented by the index b. This composite good has
a retail price of p. In compensation packages, b represents nonwage
compensation. Employers receive discounts for bulk purchases of benefit
goods, represented by d. They purchase these goods with pre—income—tax
dollars, at an effective price of (1—d)p. In consumption bundles, b
reprsents benefit consumption. Employees must purchase benefit goods
with cash, at an effective price of (1+t)p.
Employee utility is given by U(bx). It is a function of the com-
posite nonbenefit good ——disposableearnings ——andthe composite
benefit good. Employee cost of any arbitrary consumption bundle (b*,x*)
is the expenditure necessary to purchase it at retail. It is given by:
C1 =(1+t)pb+(1+t)x*
(1)
is the utility value of consumption bundle (b*,x*),7
=U(b*,x*).
Employee value of any consumption bundle is equal to Y*,the minimum
level of income necessary to attain the utility level of this bundle
The analyss in this paper assume that employee utility levels are
fixed at U as a result of competition in the labor market. Analyses




where E represents the expenditure function (Varian). If the employee
chooses his or her consumption bundle inefficiently, its cost will
exceed its value. By definition,
Cl.
consumption bundle is efficient under personal provision if equality
holds.
The employer expenditure for compensation package (b*,x*) is the
expenditure the employer must incur in order to provide that package to
his or her employees. It is given as:
C2 =(ld)pb*+(1+t)x*
This definition and that of C1 in equation 1 prove that
C2 < C1.
Any bundle of benefit and nonbenefit goods can be more cheaply purchased
by the employer than by an employee.
Employer value of any compensation package is equal to the minimum
—9--level of expenditure the employer must incur in order to provide his or
her employee with the util itylevelrepresented by that package. It is
given as:
Y =EE(1—d)p,(1+t); U*]
14 a compensation package is inefficiently composed, its cost to the
employer will be greater than necessary to provide employees with U. By
defi n it on,
C2
As with personal provision, a compensation package is efficient under
employer provision if equality holds.
C1, C2,Y andY are displayed graphically inFigure 1. The point at
which a budget line intersects the x, or wage axis, represents the
dollar value of all (b,x) combinations which lie on that line. Budget
lines with steep slopes represent the possibilities of employer provi-
sion; relatively small quantities of wages can be exchanged for rela-
tively large quantities of nonwage compensation. Budget lines with flat
slopes represent the possibilities of personal provision; relatively
large quantities of nonbenefit goods must be sacrificed for relatively
small quantities of benefit goods.
Figure 1 also identifies four bundles of benefit and nonbenefit
—10—goods, each providing the same level of util it)', U. The budget 1 ines on
which point I lies demonstrate that employer cost for any bundle is less
than employee cost. The employer budget line always intersects the x
axis at a point to the left of the intersection of that axis and the
employee budget line. This bundle also demonstrates inefficient alloca-
tion in either employer or personal provision.
Employee value is represented by the consumption bundle at point 2.
At the prices of personal provision, it is the least expensive consump-
tion bundle which provides utility U. Employer value is represented by
the compensation package at point 3. At the prices of employer provi-
sion, it is the least expensive combination of benefit and nonbenefit
goods which provides utility U. In comparison, the bundle at point 2 is
relatively intensive in nonbenefit goods. The bundle at point 3 is
relatively intensive in benefit goods.
This figure demonstrates concisely the most significant aspect of
employer benefits provision. The absolute price of disposable earnings
is the same to employers and employees. However, the absolute price of
benefit goods to employers is less than that to employees. In conse-
quence, employer value is always less than employee va1ue8
8
The expenditure function increases in all prices (Varian>. This
conclusion is a simple appi icat ion of that theorem.
—11—Any given level of utility can be attained throuQh employer provision at
less expense then through personal provision.
Tax advantages and bulk discounts for benefit goods provide employers
with opportunities to reduce labor costs by offering consumption goods
as compensation, in addition to cash wages. The employer who wishes to
take advantage of this opportunity must offer a compensation package for
which employee value Y exceeds employer expenditure C2. The optimal
• 9 compensation package maximizes iiiS excess.
Compensation packages which fulfill these conditions always exist.
However, there is no guarantee that employers will, in practice, be able
to identify them. The employer must know employee preferences precisely
in order to allocate compensation expenditures efficiently. In the
absence of such knowledge, employer expenditure is likely to exceed
10
employer value. 14 the employer s choice of compensation packages is
especially infelicitous ——point4 in figure 1 is an example ——employer
expenditure can exceed employee value:
C2 )
In this circumstance, employees value their compensation package atless
With utility fixed at U, this is equivalent to minimizing employer
expendi ture.
10
Empirical studies tentatively suggest that employers, and even union
representatives, can not accurately predict employee compensation
preferences <Brosnan, Lawler and Levin, Nealey, Nealey and Goodale)
—12—than its cost to the employer. Personal provision of benefit Qoods
would be less expensive to the employer than is inept employer provi—
SiOn.
The relationships in Figure 1 demonstrate the general problems of
compensation composition. Employees are not indifferent between dif-
ferent compensation bundles which represent identical levels of employer
cost ——thebundles which define an employer's budget line are on dif-
ferent indifference curves. Consumption bundles of identical utility
value represent different levels of expenditure under employer and under
personal provision ——bundleson a single indifference curve are drawn
from different budget lines.
Algebraic formulations reiterate these relationships. Optimal con-
sumption bundles under personal provision minimize the monetary income
which must be earned —— —— inorder to support the given level of




The following first order condition determines optimal bundle coniposi—
t Ion:
Both extremes of the indifference curve represent compensation
packages which merit this disdain. They are over—intensive in either
wage or nonwage compensation.
—13—UI—=p, -
U2
where U1 and U2 respectively represent the marginal utilities of b and
x.
Optimal compensation packages under employer provision maximize
employer profits ——it——whileinsuring employees the required util it>'
level. If the number of employees is n, the production function is f(n)
and output is the nurneraire good, then optimal packages solve the fol-
lowing problem:
Maximize it =f(n)—nE(1—d)pb +(1+t)x]
subject to U(b,x)=U*
(3)
The following first order condition determines optimal package composi-
tion in this case:
U1 (1—d)p —= <p.
U2
1+t
Benefits are relatively cheaper to the employer than they are to the
employee. Optimal compensation packages will be relatively more inten-
sive in benefit goods than will be optimal consumption bundles under
personal provision at any given level of utility.
In general, employers can offer employees a given utility level with
—14—lower expenditures if they distribute benefit goods alonQ with wages
than if they offer only wages with which employees purchase their own
benefits. This economy is available because employers can purchase
benefit goods at lower prices than can employees. Optimal compensation
packages under employer provision substitute relatively inexpensive
benefits for relatively expensive wages, in comparison to optimal con-
sumption bundles under personal provision which represent the same
utilityvalue. The subsection which follows develops these results
further in the context of a specific utility function.
B. Optimal Compensation With Cobb—Douglas Utility
Equations 2 and 3 can be solved explicitly with respect to a specific
functional form for the employee's utility function. A Cobb—Douglas




The exponent, a, represents relative tastes for benefit and nonbenef it
goods. It also represents the optimal share of benefit goods in compen-
sation or consumption expenditures.
With this specification, solutions to equations 2 and 3 suggest that
—15—the optimal compensation package under employer provision can be 4< to
14< less expensive than the optimal consumption bundle under personal
provision which provides the same level of utility. This economy is
largely attributable to substantial tax subsidies under proportional
taxation. These subsidies are larger under progressive taxation, because
maximum tax rates under employer provision are endogenous.
1. Proportional Taxation
Under proportional taxation, employees convey a fixed proportion of
their taxable income to the government, regardless of its magnitude.
12
Differences in the definitions of taxable income between personal and
employer provision are responsible for differences between optimal
consumption bundles in the first case, and optimal compensation packages
in the latter. The optimal consumption bundle is more intensive in
nonbenefit goods and more expensive than is the optimal compensation
pack ge, given a constant level of utility.
The optimal consumption bundle under personal provision solves equations
2 and 4 at U(b,x) U, where U* is fixed. The solution consists of an
12In practice, the tax rate is usually defined as a function of tax-
able income. In this study, the tax rate is defined as a function of
post—tax consumption, for illustrative convenience. These two
definitions are equivalent, as taxable income is identically equal
to the sum of post—tax income and tax payments.
—16—optimal level of benefit consumption, b*, and an optimal level of non—
benefit consumption, x in terms of the fixed util it>' level:
u-i
**p(1—u)





x =U £ ]
a
(6)
Together, b* and x are represented by point 2 in Figure 1. Employee




Y =U E It—)
a 1-u
(7)
The optimal compensation package under employer provision solves
equations 3 and 4 at U(b,x) U. The solution consists of optimal
benefit and nonbenefit consumption levels b and x in terms of
a-i a-i
— *p(1—a) 1—d





x =U C It—)
a 1+t
(9)









Equations 5 and 8 prove that
b* <
Nonwage compensation under optimal employer provision is greater than




Non—benefit consumption is greater under optimal personal provision than
is wage compensation under optimal employer provision. Equation 10
proves that
>
employeevalue is greater than employer value.
Explicit solutions for optimal income and consumption quantities also
reaffirm that disposable earnings and earnings under employer provision
understate employer value, which itself understates employee value
—18—x < x(1+t) < Y < -
Earningsunder employer provision underestimate the value to the
employee of his compensation package by more than they underestimate the
13 cost incurred by the employer in its provision.
The difference between employee and employer' value isgivenas:
*
Y—Y= El-(—) 3 > 0
1+t
This difference represents the total advantage accruing to employer
13
In addition, earnings under personal provision usually underestimate
employer value:
x*(1+t) < Y





In this circumstance, benefits are so inexpensive to the employer that
b isenormousand x is tiny. Employer costs are so reduced by the
discount on benefit purchases that
Y < x*(1+t)
Total employer costs under employer provision are less than pre—tax
nonbenefit consumption alone under personal provision. This circumstance
requires unusually large values of tand d in this model; if a.3, then
it occurs only if d + .3t > .7
—19—provision over personal provision as a result of its privileged tax
protection. This advantage is considerable. If the employer's discount
on benefit purchases is lOX (d.1), the exponent of benefit consumption
• 14





Employer value is 8.3X less than employee value.
15Employer value is
1O.4X less than employee value, if t.3
16
This difference may be
substantial. The model presented here is not designed to produce a
14Unless otherwise specified, all numerical simulations use these
parameter values. The value d=.1 is a reasonable average of the
discounts presented in Fosu. Chamber of Commerce surveys of compen-
sation practices ——theonly private sector surveys which measure
costs of paid time not worked ——demonstratethat the share of
nonwage compensation in total compensation has been equal to ap-
proximately .3 for the last several years (Chamber of Commerce,
1984). This value is assigned to abecause the optimal share of a good
in consumption expenditures is equal to the exponent it carries in
the Cobb—Douglas utility function.
15 • •
Srneedings empirical analysis of the differences between employer
cost and employee value suggests an estimate of this difference at
6.3X .Hisestimate and that presented here are not entirely com-
parable, as he ignores consumption expenditure reallocations induced
by tax exemptions for nonwage compensation.
16These estimates are representative of those which obtain for a wide
range of reasonable parameter values. In general, the advantages of
employer provision increase with tax rates, bulk discounts and
preferences for benefit goods. If t.2, strong preferences for
benefit goods (cx.4)andlarge employer discounts (d.15) increase
the difference above to 12.9X. In contrast, reduced preferences for
benefit goods (a.2) and reduced employer discounts (d=.05) limit
this difference to 4.6V., at the same tax rate.
—20—precise estimate of this reduction.
17
However, the magnitudes it SuQ—
qests are noteworthy. National income accounts for the United States
give employer expenditures for employee compensation in 1984 as $2.173
trillion (Bureau of Economic Analysis). If this is taken as employer
value, equation 11 with t=.2 implies that employee value exceeds it by
$180.4 billion.
The difference between employee and employer value is comprised of
the difference in retail payments under personal and employer provision
and the difference in tax payments:
—Y=((x*_;)+ p(b*_b(1_d))]
* a—
+ [tpb + t(x —x)]
(12)
Retail costs of consumption packages are usually greater under personal
than under employer provision, but need not be. The 'composition' effect
of tax privileges on nonwage compensation is given as:
(x —x) + p(b —b(1—d)) =
17
This model analyzes individual compensation packages. Its use in the
estimation of national economic activity entails many assumptions
about aggregation which should not be casually invoked. In addition,
welfare levels are taken as constant in the model and in all suc-
ceeding calculations. These calculations ignore the general equi—
1 ibrium effects of tax privileges for nonwage compensation on equi—






U[ I C—] El — (—) ( +) ]
a 1-a 1+t
Simulationsdemonstrate that, with Cobb—Douglas utility, this cornposi—
tion effect is positive unless d is very small and t is very large.
Usually, increases in consumption of benefit goods under employer provi-
sion are small relative to reductions in wages and in the post—discount
price of benefit goods.
18
Tax payments under employer provision are always less than those
under personal provision. The 'excise' effect of tax privileges is
always positive:
a
* * *p(1—a 1 1—d
tpb+t(x—x) =tUC I C—) Cl —(—) (1—a)] > 0
a 1—a 1+t
(13)
Tax payments under employer provision are less than those under personal
provision, both because benefit goods provided by the employer are not
subject to taxation, and because optimal consumption bundles contain
greater shares of benefit goods under employer provision.
Equation 11 demonstrates that employers are able to substantially
18
Composition effects are rarely negative under Cobb—Douglas utility
because this utility function restricts ordinary own—price elas-
ticities of demand to equal —1 .Compositioneffects may be more
regularly negative under utility functions which permit demand for
benefits to be more elastic.
—22-reduce expenditures for employee compensation if nonwage compensation is
not subject to income tax. Equation 13 measures the size of the subsidy
these tax privileges confer. This subsidy, as a proportion of the total













If the composition effect of tax privileges is negative, the reduction
in government tax revenue actually exceeds the savings which accrue to
employers. Positive composition effects reinforce the subsidy under most
values for Cobb—Douglas parameters. With a.3, d.1 and t.2, the tax
subsidy contributes 72.1X of the difference between employee and
employer value. If t.3, that contribution rises to 82.4X.
This subsidy may represent a significant reduction in tax receipts.
As an example, the excess of employee value over employer value es-
timated by equation 11 with t=.2, the parameter values on which this
estimate is based, and equation 14 imply that income tax revenues
foregone in 1984 through tax exemptions for nonwaqe compensation
amounted to approximately $130.0 billion. This subsidy estimate is more
—23—than twice as large as expi ict Medicare subsidies for health care
($57.5 bill ion), and nearly half as large as actual federal income tax
revenue ($296.2 bill ion) in 1984 (Economic Report of the President,
Table B—71). As a further example, impi icit tax subsidies to homeowner—
ship in 1966 were approximately $7 billion, in contemporary dollars
(Aaron). With cx.2,19 d.1 and t.2, equations 11 and 14 imply that
implicit tax subsidies to employment through exemption of nonwage corn—
pensation amounted to $17.9 billion.
Tax privileges for nonwage compensation have two separable effects;
they alter the composition of consumption bundles, and they subsidize
employment costs for employers. Alternative taxation policies could, in
principle, achieve either of these effects without invoking the other.
Subsidization, if that is the primary purpose, can be achieved through
lump—sum payments to employers of
—Y,without altering the prices of
benefit goods relative to nonbenefit goods.
If the primary purpose of policy is to induce greater consumption of
benefit goods, relative to nonbenefit goods, tax exemptions for nonwage
compensation and lump—sum taxes can be combined so as to avoid any net
subsidy to employers, or any net change in tax revenue. With exemptions
for nonwage compensation, lump—sum taxes equal to S1'Y,
19Companies surveyed by the Chamber of Commerce in 1967 reported the
average share of nonwage compensation in total compensation to be
22.9Y (Chamber of Commerce, 1981).
—24—1+t
Si =[(—) — 1]
1—d
equate employer expenditures on employee compensation under exemptions
to expenditures in their absence. This surcharge is equal to 9.OX o4
employer value, given t.2 and the values 4or d and a used as examples
throughout this paper. It is equal -to1I.7Yi4 t.3
Lump—sum taxes equal to S2Y,
=E— N—) — (1—a)] —I+t 1—d
provide total tax revenues equal to those which would be collected under
personal provision, in the absence of exemptions. This surcharge is
equal to 6.5 if t=.2, to 9.6 if t=.3
20
20
The difference between constant expenditure and constant revenue
surcharaes, -
S1
—S, = [—-—] N—) — (1+at))
—l+t 1—d
is equal to zero only where parameter values are such that the composi-
tion effect of tax privileges for nonwage compensation is zero.
—25-2. Progressive Taxation
Income tax exemptions for nonwage compensation create an incentive for
employer provision which does not vary with the level oftaxableincome
if taxation is proportional. Progressive taxation creates an incentive
for employer provision which increases with the level of taxable income,
with tax rates, and with the degree of progressivity. The excess of
employee value over employer value is greater if taxation is progressive
than if it is proportional.
Progressive tax schemes apply increasing rates of taxation to addi—
tional increments of taxable income. B. defines these increments as the
J
width,in dollars, of the Jth tax bracket. The tax rate, t., applies to
that part of income which falls in the jth bracket. The index i repre-
sents the highest bracket into which taxable income falls. Total tax
payments tT) are given by:
i—I








—26—The budget constraint for an employee who purchases hisorher own
benefitgoods out of post—tax earnings has slope equal to —p, the retail
price for benefit goods, under progressive as well as under proportional
taxation. Benefit and nonbenefit consumption levels, b* and x, are
determined by equations 5 and 6 in either regime. in contrast, progres-
sive taxation changes the minimum level of pre—tax income from which
these quantities can be purchased.












= UE ] C I —IB. (t.* —t.)
1—
I
= Y*(t)—IB. (t.* —t.)
3=1' '
(15)
Thebracket iisthe highest bracket into which employee taxable income
falls. It is defined implicitly by this condition:
i*_1 * * IB. < x +pb<lB.
3=1 3=1
Y*(t*) is the solution to equation 7 at a proportional tax rate equal
—27—to the tax rate in bracket i. Employee value under progressive taxation
is similar to that under proportional taxation, with an adjustment for
tax payments below the rate of t.* in brackets below 1*.
The budget constraint for an employer who provides employees with
benefit goods as part of their compensation package is also linear under
proportional taxation. Under progressive taxation, this budget con-
straint becomes piecewise linear. It is linear within a tax bracket, B4,
and continuous but not differentiable at the boundary between two brack-
ets. The relative price of benefit goods decreases as j, the bracket
index, increases.
Figure 2 portrays the budget constraint for employer provision under
progressive taxation. The ith bracket begins at
i—i




The relative price of nonwage compensation decreases as taxable income
exceeds one tax bracket and enters the next.
The compensation package at point I represents the employer value of
utility level U1. The package at point 2 represents employer value of
utility level U2. The budget constraints associated with these utility
levels demonstrate the incentives to which employers are subject.
—28—The optimal compensation package for utility levelU2 at the optimal
price ratio for utility level U1 is at point 3. However, wages at point
3 fall within a higher tax bracket than do wages at point 1. The actual
relative price of nonwage compensation in that bracket is lower than in
the bracket of point 1, so point 3 is inefficient. Point 2 istheactual
optimum compensation package for U2. It represents less taxable cornpen—
sation than point 3, but more nonwage compensation. 21
Composition of the optimal compensation package depends only on the
marginal tax rate, that prevailing in the tax bracket which includes the
value of taxable compensation. Equations 8 and 5', with the tax rate of
that bracket, also represent the optimal levels of nonwage and wage
compensation under progressive taxation.
As with employee value, employer value under progressive taxation (Y)
differs from that under proportional taxation in order to reflect the
difference in tax payments:
i—i —i—i
Y=x+(1—d)pb+It.B. +t'(x —IB.)
p j=1 J J I J
21
Alpert tests empirically the proposition that compensation packages
are composed of wage and nonwage components in constant proportions.
Triplett asserts that proportionality can not occur with progressive
taxation except with unusual utility functions. Figure 2 confirms
Triplett's statement: Under progressive taxation, the slope of the
budget constraint is increasing along any ray from the origin.
Optimal compensation packages cannot be composed of components in
constant proportions if utility is homothetic.
-29—a 1+t a
*pU—a) 1—d
=U C I C I CI —B. (t—t.)
J I J
a 1—a 1+t' j=1
=Y(t)—EB. (ta'— t.)
I J I J
(16)
The bracket iisthe highest bracket into which earnings, x, fall:
i—i —
XB. < x < I B.
j=lJ j=l
Y(t1) is the employer cost ofequation10, calculated at the tax
rate of bracket i
Underspecified tax rates and tax brackets, the solutions to equa-
tions 15 and 16 demonstrate that employee value exceeds employer value
under progressive as well as under proportional taxation.
22If tax
rates are a linear function of the tax bracket, t=jt for all brackets
j, then the difference between maximum tax rates under personal and
under employer provision is:
22Proofs for all mathematical statements in this section are available
from the author.
—30 —it— it= t <i—i)
I I
Thisdifference is nonnegative, as the maximum tax bracket achieved













At lowlevelsofUand broad tax brackets, x +band x may both
qualify in the same tax bracket. Marginal tax rates would be identi-
cal under either employer or personal provision. In this case, the* resultsderived under proportional taxation continue to apply. As U
increases and the breadth o4 tax brackets decreases, the probability
increases that private provision will place the employee in a higher
tax bracket than will employer provision.
—31—Further, if taxable earnings under personal and under employer provision




The difference between employee and employer value under progressive
taxation exceeds the difference under proportional taxation. Progressive
taxation increases the advantages to employer provision of nonwage
compensation, by compounding tax exemptions analyzed in the previous
section with reduced rates of taxation on earnings still subject to tax.
As in the case of proportional taxation, the difference between
employee and employer value under progressive taxation is comprised of
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- 32—(17)
The first term of equation 17 represents the difference between retail
values of consumption. This composition effect is identical to that
encountered under proportional taxation, as given in equation 12.
The second term of equation 17 represents the difference between tax
payments under personal and employer provision. The components of this
term are analogous to those of equation 12, but differ in that they
include adjustments for tax progressivity. Under the assumptions given
above, the difference between tax payments, is bounded below;
41 ￿ (1/2) Bt E i*(i*_1) —i(isl)]
p
TIi luwr bound for this difference depends on the brackets i and i
and on the difference between them. If i =I+k,where k indicates the
extent of progressivity, then
41 ￿ (1/2) Bt [(2i+k) (k—i)] ? 0.
p
represents the impl icit tax subsidy allowed to employer provision of
nonbenefit goods under progressive taxation. The lower bound for this
subsidy increases with tax progressivity (with k), with the increment
added to tax rates at each new bracket (with t) and with the minimum
bracket attained under employer provision (with i).
—33—The size of this tax subsidy, relative to the difference between
employee and employer value, depends upon the exact relationship between
taxable earnings and tax brackets. If the taxable components of income
under either employer or personal provision are equal to the maximum
levels in their respective brackets;
* *.*
x+pb=i Band x =
thentax revenue under personal provision is given as:
I tB. =(1/2)tBi* (i*+1) =(1/2)t(x*+pb*) (1*1)
j=1
J J
Tax revenue under employer provision is given as:
I t. B. =(1/2)tBi (i+1) =(1/2)tx (i+1)
j=1 J J
Withthese conditions, the loss of tax revenue represented by the




4T =(1/2)tU [ ] t—] ( (i—I) (1—( ) (1—a)] +k) > 0
p a 1—a
With the same conditions, equation 17 gives the savings accruing to an





*p(1—a) I 1—d a I 1—d
U [ ] [—1 CE1—( ) (1+ait)] +—tE(i—1)[1—( ) (1—cx)]+k))
a I—u 2
i+it
This savings, as well as that between tax payments, increases withk,
the progressivity of the tax system. Nevertheless, if the composition
effect is not negative ——ifthe tax subsidy does not exceed net
employer savings ——thesubsidy provides an increasing share of employer
24 savings as k increases.
111. ADDlications
The analysis of Section II demonstrates that earnings and income
'easures differ systematically under personal and employer provision of
benefit goods. The discussion in this section demonstrates that inap-
propriate income concepts give rise to incorrect analyses of welfare
distribution, taxation equity and returns to human capital. It suggests
that similar problems will arise in analyses of many other important
24
If d=.1, then the composition effect in this model is negative only
if t.6 .Inthe context of progressive taxation, these values are
extreme. The marginal tax rate in bracket i is it. If the marginal
tax rate in the American economy is approximately .4 (Stuart, for
example), and that rate is achieved in the thirteenth or fourteenth
tax bracket (Schedule X, Internal Revenue Service), then t is on the
order of .05.
—35—issues. Utility can not be accurately inferred on the basis of incom—
plete measures of either income or consumption.
25This section explores
problems which arise when compensation packages are efficient. The
problems it reveals must be compounded unpredictably if they are not.
Truly progressive taxation schemes, such as that of Section 11, are
too cumbersome for application in this presentation. The analysis in
this section is based upon a quasi—progressive tax scheme in which
individual taxation is proportional. Higher proportional tax rates at
higher levels ofutilitygenerate progessivity across individuals.
Throughout this section,
** ,j > iandU. > U.
J I
Thetax rate app] ied to individuals with utility of is tk where
i,Jand
t. > t..
The conclusions drawn within this taxation scheme should obtain under
truly progressive schemes, as well.
25The interpersonal comparisons discussed in this section are con-
ducted under the assumption of identical utility functions.
—36—1. Distributionof Income and Taxation
The distribution of util ities among employees differs from the distribu-
tions of employee and employer value, earnings and disposable earnings
under progressive or quasi—progressive taxation schemes, and under most
util it>' functions. The effects of progressivity on tax payments ensure
that the cost of compensation packages increases more rapidly than does
the utility they provide. The composition effects of tax exemptions for
nonwage compensation usually ensure that disposable earnings increase
less rapidly than does the utility derived from the compensation
26 packages of which they are a part.
Solutions to equation 10 demonstrate the relationship between
employer values at different levels of welfare:
c.
1—cx
_i=_L[J) . 1+t. U.
Y. i I
(18)
Solutions to equation 7 demonstrate the same relationship under personal
pray is ion:
26
This discussion compares employees at different levels of utility
within either employer or personal provision. Comparisons between
employees who differ in the manner by which they obtain benefit




.i_[ Jj >_i -
Y*U* 1+t.
I I 1 (19)
These relationships prove that the distribution of employee value is
more attenuated than the distribution of employee utilities. The dis-
tribution of employer' value is less attenuated than that of employee
value because substitution of nonwage for wage compensation under
employer provision reduces the growth in employer value with increases
in utility. However, this distribution still overstates disparities in
utility. The share of tax payments in both employee and employer value
increases with utility under progressive and quasi—progressive taxation
schemes. In consequence, value ratios exceed utility ratios. L4hile this
result is demonstrated using Cobb—Douglas utility, it should hold
regardless of the utility function.
Under employer provision, distributions of earnings and disposable
earnings provide upper and lower bounds for the underlying distribution
of employee utilities. Disparities in disposable earnings underestimate
disparities in utility because nonwage compensation substitutes increas-
ingly for wages as utility increases. However, the growth of tax pay—
rnents with utility is more rapid than the decline of wages. As a result,
earnings disparities overestimate utility disparities. 27
27
This last result is imposed by the Cobb—Douglas util it>'function,
which forces the share of earnings in employer value to be constant.
Utility functions which allow that share to decrease could generate
earnings disparities which underestimate the extent oF util it>'
disparities. Empirically, Srneeding claims that the distribution of
employer value is more attenuated than that of earnings.











The distribution of employer—provided disposable income is more com-
pressed than the distribution of utilities, while the distribution of
earnings is more attenuated.
Of the income concepts discussed here, only disposable earninQs under
personal provision and Cobb—Douglas utility provide anaccurate basis
for interpersonal comparisons of welfare. The solution to equation 6
demonstrates that x is in fixed proportion to the level of utility: 28





The relative price of benefit to nonbenefit consumption is constant
under personal provision, regardless of the taxation scheme. There-
fore, the composition of consumption bundles does not vary with
utility, and this result holds, for all homothetic utility func—
t ions.
—39—The distribution of disposable earnings under personal provision
reproduces faithfully the underlying distribution of employee utilities.
The relationship in equation 21 also proves that disparities in pre—tax
nonbenefit consumption under personal provision overstate utility di;—
parities. Pre—tax expenditures on nonbenefit goods under personal provi-
sion are not proportional to utility because they are inflated by
progressive tax payments.
in the examples of this section, nominal tax rates are specific to
utility levels. Intended tax revenue is equal to tkU at any utility
level U. If tax rates are applied to observable income measures rather
than utility, actual tax progressivity almost always differs from
nominal, intended progressivity. Equation 21, multiplied by the ratio
t./t. ,demonstratesthat actual progressivity is equal to nominal
progressivity only where taxation is applied to nonbenefit consumption
under personal provision.
Equations 18 through 20 demonstrate that other taxation schemes do
not produce intended progressivity. Taxation of employer value, earn—
ings, employee value or pre—tax nonbenef it consumption takes revenue
disproportionately from employees with high levels of utility. In all
these cases, actual progressivity is greater than nominal progressivity.
Taxation of disposable earnings under employer provision takes revenue
disproportionately from employees with low levels of utility. In this
—40—29 case, actual progressivity ts less than nominal progressivity.
2. Returns to SchoolinQ
Accurate estimates of returns to schooling require accurate measures of
returns. Standard empirical analyses rely on the relationship between
schooling and earnings differentials to reveal the benefits of addi-
tional study (Mincer). Duncan attempts to include a measure of nonwage
compensation, as well, but does not have access to adequate data.
Theoretically, the concepts developed in Section 11 indicate that
returns may be badly misestimated when compensation is misrepresented.
Human capital is denoted by Hk, where ki,j and H > H. .Human
capital level Hk supports utility level Uk for all values of 1<, where U.








The assumptions which obtain in this discussion assure exoQenously
the level of utility. In this context, these distortions are imposed
upon the employer.





where k =U/Uand k =H/H.
I ji 2 j
1+compensation packages contain both taxable wages and tax—exempt
nonwage compensation in optimal proportions, the true returns ofequa-
tion 22 cannot be estimated correctly by disposable earnings, earnings
or employer value. Estimated returns based on dierentials in dis-
posable earnings are given by
x.—x. 1
R =C 'H ]
I H. —H.
x. j









Under progressive or quasi—progressive taxation, increases in utility
are accompanied by increases in disposable earninqs which are less than
proportionate. Disposable earnings dierentials understate utility
dif4erentials (equation 20) and there$ore underestimate true returns to
school ing.
—42—Estimated returns to schooling based on employer value,
Y.-Y. I
R 1, 2 H. —H.
YE
J I









Increases in utility require more than proportionate increases in
employer value under progressive or quasi—progressive taxation schemes
(equation 18). Employer value differentials overstate utility differen-
tials and overestimate returns to human capital.
In this example, earnings differentials yield overestimates of
returns to human capital which are identical to those produced by
employer value differentials. This result is guaranteed by the Cobb—
Douglas representation of util ity, which forces proportional it>' between
earnings and employer value at any level of compensation or taxation
(equations 9 and 10). If employee utility functions require that optimal
shares of earnings in employer value decrease as tax rates increase ——
ineffect, price elasticities greater than unity ——earningsdi-fferen—
tials will not overestimate utility differentials as dramatically as do
employer value differentials. However, earnings differentials will
—43—overesttrnate util it>' d,fferentals by more than do value differentials
ifearningsshares increase with tax rates.
The dierences between true and estimated returns to human capital
may be substantial. For example, where t1.1 , .3, and k1k2=1 .1,
true returns are equal to:
R* =











No measure of compensation under employer provision correctly es-
timates true returns to human capital. Measures of disposable earnings
and earnings or employer cost give rise to estimates which bound the
true value on either side, but which miss it by wide margins.
—44—IV. Conclusion
This paper has explored the interactions between tax privileges,optimal
consumption bundles and optimal compensation packages. If employers and
employees understand these interactions, they can be manipulated to the
benefit of both. In contrast, analysts must suffer fromtheseinterac-
tions, whether or not they understand them.
Employers can reduce compensation costs without reducing employee
ut;lity by offering compensation packages which contain nonwage cam—
nents when these components are exempt fromincometaxation. This
opportunity is not a guarantee, however. Employers must know their
employees' preferences in order to take advantage of these tax
privileges. If they do not know them, they risk constructing a cornpli—
cated compensation package which is more costly than it would be were it
to include only wages.
Economists must usually choose between several imperfectly correlated
measures of compensation and income when compensation packages include
nonwage components. The correct measure is usually unavailable. For most
labor demand problems, cost of the entire compensation package isprob-
ably the appropriate measure of compensation. For most consumption and
labor supply problems, utility is the appropriate measure of income.
—45—Many data sets measure only earnings. The analysis in this paper
demonstrates that earnings differentials hardly ever provide accurate
direct estimates of util ity differentials. Here, they are proportional
to compensation cost differentials only because util it>' is represented
as a Cobb—Douglas function. Appropriate measures of income and compensa-
tion may be inferrable fromearningsmeasures if the compensation
package of which earnings are a part is efficient. If it is not, earn-
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